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Governmental Liability for Inadequate Traffic Sign
Robert C. Egger*
T IS AN ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF LAW that an automobile accident is the
result of a failure in one or more elements of a three component sys-
tem made up of driver, roadway, and vehicle.' Often investigators look
only for the primary cause of an accident.2 This line of reasoning will
lead to attribution of about 75% of all accidents to driver failure, 15%
to highway deficiencies, and 10% to vehicle malfunctions. 3 On the other
hand, reliance on a theory that accidents are generally the result of the
combination of multiple failures would probably show that a combination
of highway defect and a driver failure would appear as the cause in at
least 40% of all accidents.4
In view of this, a good many automobile accidents are due to joint
failures by both drivers and those having responsibility for the condition
of the highway facility. Many states hold that in the absence of a serious
breach of duty by a driver, a gratuitous rider injured in an auto accident
has no claim against such driver.5 The victim must then look elsewhere
to recover his damage. If more than one vehicle is involved, the victim
might be able to find an actionable breach of duty by another driver.6
There are, however, many single car accidents every year.7 If one looks
only to driver failure as a cause, most gratuitous riders in these vehicles
are left without recourse. However, since as shown above, highway sys-
tem failures are a concurrent cause in about 40% of all accidents, gratui-
tous riders, even those involved in one car accidents, often have at least
a moral right to look to those responsible for the highway defects.8
The fact that nearly all highways are built and maintained by gov-
ernmental agencies adds enormous complexity to recovery based on high-
way defect causation.9 While there is extremely little precedent for hold-
* B.S. in Engineering, Case Western Reserve Univ.; Third-year student at Cleve-
land-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Univ.; Registered E.I.T., Ohio; Assist-
ant Division Traffic Engineer, Division 12, Ohio Department of Highways.
1 Baldwin, Accident Causes and Countermeasures, 36 Traffic Engineering 31 (March1966); Erlsten, Defectively Designed Highways, 16 Clev. Mar. L. Rev. 264 (1967).
2 Kimber, C., Captain Ohio Highway Patrol, Accident Investigation (presented at
"Short Course on Traffic Engineering Studies for Safety Improvements" Ohio State
University, October, 1968).
3 Baldwin, op. cit. supra note 1.
4 Ibid.
5 Prosser, Torts, 451-452 (2d ed. 1955). For trial examination aspects of auto cases,
see 1 Encyc. of Negligence, c. VI (1962).
6 6 Blashfield's Automobile Law and Practice 3, (Lewis, ed., 3d ed. 1966).
7 Ohio Department of Highway Safety, 1967 Ohio Traffic Accident Facts (1968 ed.)indicates that there were 23,326 non-collision (one car) accidents involving injuries
in Ohio in 1967.
8 Lewis, supra note 6 at 325 (1966).
9 See generally, Erlsten supra note 1; 4 Lewis supra note 6, Chapter 161, 291-340.
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ing a governmental agency liable for injury resulting from a defect de-
signed into a highway,10 there are more than a few cases finding liability
based on inadequate highway signing.1' This result is consistent with the
nature of our highway system today and the practical economics in-
volved. Highways are still in use today that were built 40 years ago.1
2
The technology of road building has steadily developed since that time.
The result is that the present system is a mixture reflecting various de-
sign policies, and older sections are deficient by modern or even average
standards. Other deficiencies may be the result of a supposed or even
genuine need to economize. 13 For instance, extremely high right of way
costs may mean that an engineer is forced to design a curve which is
more sharp than the usual standards require, 14 or upgrading of only part
of a road might have been possible, requiring that the driver going from
the new section to the old section adjust his driving technique. 15
Additionally, there are conditions, even where the most modern de-
sign techniques are used, which require the special attention of the
driver.16 These include intersections, merging traffic lanes, curves in exit
ramps, and reduction in the number of lanes.1 7 One of the principal pur-
poses of highway signing is to call the driver's attention to such potential
hazards,' 8 and, while it may not be practical or even possible to eliminate
these conditions, it is relatively cheap to provide highway signs.19 The
duty of governmental agencies to provide adequate highway signing has
in many cases been established, but there appears to be wide variation
in the tests for situations which establish a duty to sign and the adequacy
of the signing itself.20 At one end of the scale is Moore v. Columbus2 1
in which a "Dead End" warning sign was not visible because its sup-
port was bent and twisted, and a 1969 case of a defective traffic light re-
sulting in liability.21 a This condition was given, at the most, the effect
10 See generally, Erlsten, op. cit. supra note 1.
11 See generally, Erlsten, op. cit. supra note 1; Annot., 55 A.L.R. 2d 1000 (1957).
12 E.g., Ohio Dept. of Highways records show that State Route 166 in Geauga County
has been a state highway since 1927 and that there has been no major reconstruction
since that time.
13 Erlsten, op. cit. supra at 270.
14 The connection of Interstate Route 90 and State Route 2 (known as the Innerbelt
curve) in Cleveland, Ohio is an example of this.
15 McCormick v. State, 5 Misc. 2d 582, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 666 (1957).
16 National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices, 53 (1961 ed).
17 Ibid.
18 Id. at 7.
19 Ohio Dept. of Highways, Summary of Contracts Awarded (for calendar year
1967) indicates that the cost of new construction was about 878 thousand dollars per
mile while the cost of a typical warning sign installation was about 70 dollars.
20 55 A.L.R. 2d 1000 (1957).
21 74 Ohio Law Abst. 136, 139 N.E. 2d 656 (Ohio App., Franklin Co., 1956).
21a Fankhouser v. City of Mansfield, 19 Ohio St. 2d 102, 249 N.E. 2d 789 (1969).
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LIABILITY FOR TRAFFIC SIGN
of having contributed to the fact that a nuisance, as required for a find-
ing of liability, did exist. On the other end of the scale is Reynolds v.
State22 in which it was found that the State of New York had breached
its duty to warn of a highway curve even though it had provided proper
curve warning and advisory speed signs which the driver had seen. The
problem was that the advisory speed limit sign stated "35 MPH." Al-
though this limit was based on standard engineering tests,23 the court
found that "25 MPH" should have been posted, and liability was estab-
lished.
Because the gratuitous rider situation, and others, provide a need for
a clear rule as to the standard of care required of a governmental agency
with regard to highway signing and because the results of present cases
seem to be at great variance, this paper is presented as an attempt to set
forth and clarify the existing standards and to propose a practical rule
for uniform adoption. Thus, the material below is confined to a study
of only the standard by which the adequacy of highway signing is meas-
ured in determining the liability of a governmental agency upon an alle-
gation naming the inadequacy of that signing as a proximate cause of
damage. The reader is reminded that many collateral issues (i.e. con-
tributory negligence of the claimant, lack of knowledge of the "hazard-
ous condition" by the agency, and temporary control of the highway by
an independent contractor) enter the picture in determining ultimate
liability.
Sovereign Immunity and the Importance of Statutory Language
It is an elementary principle of law that a government generally may
not be sued in tort by a private citizen without its consent.24 Such con-
sent is expressed in the form of statute or constitutional provision.25
Since such a provision is, by its very nature, in derogation of the com-
mon law, it is, of course, strictly construed. The exact language thus be-
comes very important and may have a direct effect upon the care re-
quired to avoid liability. For instance, the North Carolina "Tort Claims
Act" says the body hearing claims against the State, "shall determine
whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of a negligent act
of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State .... ,, 26
22 35 N.Y. Misc. 2d 757, 231 N.Y.S. 2d 681 (1962).
23 The engineering test referred to is a Ball Bank Indicator test. This is the com-
monly accepted field test. See: Baerwald, Traffic Engineering Handbook 542 (1965
3d ed.); Ohio Dept. of Highways, Bureau of Traffic, Manual of Traffic Engineering
Studies Sec. 1.25 (1968).
24 Prosser, supra note 5, at 771; 4 Lewis supra note 6, at 301.
25 Prosser, supra note 5, at 771; Vater v. County of Glen, 49 Cal. 2d 815, 323 P. 2d 85(1958); Minty v. State, 336 Mich. 370, 58 N.W. 2d 106 (1952).
26 No. Car. Gen. St. § 143-291 (1965).
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The use of only the words "a negligent act" has been the basis of denial
of recovery based on negligent omissions or failures to act by Highway
Commission employees. 27 Also, California tort claims statutes, which
speak specifically of signs and signals warning traffic, provide that a
public entity is not exonerated of its duty to provide signs etc. where
these are "necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered
the safe movement of traffic." 28 It has been held that the establishment
of the existence of "a dangerous condition" is necessary to the claimant's
case.29 Additionally, before a duty can be found to be breached it must
be found to exist. The duty of a governmental agency to provide and
maintain highway and street facilities is, of course, often imposed and/or
limited by statute.8 0 The language of these statutes is also a primary ele-
ment in establishing an actionable breach of duty.31 It goes without say-
ing that the various combinations of those statutes providing for suit
against the government and those establishing the duties of governmen-
tal agencies to construct and maintain highways and streets have been
a major factor in the development of the various rules which exist.
Yet another aspect of sovereign immunity which affects the subject
under consideration is the concept that the controlling or regulating of
traffic is an inherent governmental function even though the maintenance
of streets and highways is not.32 This, at times, results in a different rule
being applied for regulatory as opposed to warning signs, or for failure
to maintain signs as opposed to failure to initially install them.33
Existing Standards
A detailed study of three States, Ohio, New York, and California,
reveals the wide variations in the standard of care required of a govern-
mental agency with respect to traffic signs. In each case differences in
the individual State's approach to the sovereign immunity problems, just
discussed, provide unique rules.
Ohio is an example of a conservative approach. While in Ohio
claims against State agencies are handled by an administrative arm of
27 Ayscue v. N.C. State Highway Commission, 270 N.C. 100, 153 S.E. 2d 823 (1967);
Wrape v. N.C. State Highway Commission, 263 N.C. 499, 139 S.E. 2d 570 (1965); Flynn
v. N.C. Highway Commission, 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E. 2d 571 (1956).
28 Calif. Govt. Code § 830.8 (1963).
29 Feingold v. County of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 622, 62 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1967).
30 E.g. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 723.01, 5501.02, 5543.01.
31 Belt v. Grand Forks, 68 N.W. 2d 114 (No. Dak., 1955); Moore v. Columbus supra
note 21; 4 Lewis supra note 6 at 317.
32 4 Lewis, supra note 6 at 330; Moore v. Columbus, supra note 21; Mullins v. County
of Wayne, 4 Mich. App. 359, 144 N.W. 2d 829 (1966); Vickers v. City of Camden, 122
N.J.L. 14, 3 A. 2d 613 (1939); Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E. 2d
357 (1945).
33 Ibid; Also, the Calif. Govt. Code, compare § 830.4 with § 830.8.
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the legislature,34 municipalities are subject to suit35 and reported cases
dealing with alleged negligence of municipalities with respect to traffic
signs are available."6 A key to the conservative standard here is the stat-
utory requirement that the city "shall cause" its streets "to be kept open
in repair, and free from nuisance." a3 It is well established that this stat-
ute is to be strictly construed, in favor of the municipality.38 The result
is that a claimant must allege and prove that the condition he complains
of amounts to a nuisance.3 9 The burden of the municipalities is further
eased by the holding that traffic control is a strictly governmental func-
tion.40 In Tolliver v. Newark4' the Ohio Supreme Court sustained the
trial court's dismissal on demurrer where the plaintiff alleged that the
erection and maintenance of a certain pair of stop signs constituted a
nuisance. The court held, "that the regulation of traffic upon the streets
of a municipality is a governmental function; that no duty with respect
thereto is prescribed by Section 371442 General Code." 43 This result has
since been modified.44 At least one Ohio Court has gone so far as to
distinguish the duty with respect to warning signs from that with re-
spect to regulatory signs. 45  In Moore v. Columbus45a the Franklin
County Court of Appeals held that the function of a "Dead End" sign
was to "serve as a warning and also secondarily to direct traffic" 43b and
that the erection of such a sign was "not properly characterized as a gov-
ernmental function.' 45c The case involved an automobile which ran off
the end of a dead end street into a ditch at a location where the "Dead
34 Ohio Rev. Code § 127.11; Schultz, Ohio Sovereign Immunity, 28 Ohio St. L. J. 75
(1967).
35 Ohio Rev. Code § 715.01.
36 Tolliver v. Newark, supra note 32; Fritz v. Columbus, 5 Ohio St. 2d 53, 213 N.E.
2d 730 (1966); Moore v. Columbus, supra note 21.
37 Ohio Rev. Code § 723.01 (formerly General Statutes § 3714).
38 Larson v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 142 Ohio St. 20, 50 N.E. 2d 163 (1943); Geideman v.
City of Bay Village, 7 Ohio St. 2d 79, 218 N.E. 2d 621 (1966); Gabris v. Blake, 9 Ohio
St. 2d 71, 223 N.E. 2d 597 (1967).
39 Seldon v. Cuyahoga Falls, 132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.E. 2d 976 (1937); Mingo Junction
v. Sheline, 130 Ohio St. 34, 196 N.E. 987 (1935).
40 Tolliver v. City of Newark, supra note 32.
41 Ibid.
42 Now Ohio Rev. Code § 723.01.
43 Tolliver v. City of Newark, supra note 32, at 145 Ohio St. 525, 62 N.E. 2d 361.
44 Fankhauser v. City of Mansfield, 19 Ohio St. 2d 102, 249 N.E. 2d 789 (1969), held
that a malfunctioning electric traffic signal could, in itself, constitute an actionable
nuisance.
45 For the official Ohio Dept. of Highways classifications as to what constitutes either
a warning sign or a regulatory sign see Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control
Devices.
45a Supra note 21.
45b 74 Ohio L. Abs. 140, 139 N.E. 2d 660 (1956).
45c Ibid.
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End" sign was not visible because its support had been bent and twisted
nearly two weeks earlier. As the trial court, in addition to its discussion
of the sign, found a need for barriers at the location, it cannot be said
that the condition of the sign was the only basis for the finding that the
city had maintained a nuisance. However, the Court of Appeals did
specifically hold: 
46
The presence of the bent sign, if nothing more, was a part of the
physical situation which, in its entirety, the trial judge found to con-
stitute a nuisance. In that conclusion we are satisfied no error was
committed.
Thus, taking the most liberal view, it can only be said to appear that
Ohio recognizes the condition of traffic warning signs as a factor which
may contribute to the finding that a municipality maintained on its
streets a physical situation which constituted the nuisance necessary to
impose liability. Certainly this does not require a very high degree of
care with respect to highway signing.
Where Ohio is conservative, New York is very liberal. New York
Court of Claims Act 47 Section 8 states that the State "waives its immu-
nity from liability" and that its liability is to be "determined in accord-
ance with the same rules of law" as apply to individuals. It has been
held that this section should be liberally construed.4 The result of this
statutory language and judicial construction has been the establishment
of an extremely high standard of care which may have been in some
cases carried beyond reasonable extremes.
The duty of the State of New York to provide and maintain ade-
quate highway warning signs was recognized as early as 1938.49 The rule
progressed from the consideration of inadequate signing as a factor in
finding that a dangerous highway condition existed due to the negligence
of the State50 to a point where improper signing could be found to be the
sole basis for finding that the State was negligent.51
The test of the adequacy of the signing has also developed. Ziehm
v. State52 involved a "T" intersection at which the approach from the
terminated street was signed in what the court found to be a confusing
manner. The court held that these should have been replaced with signs
conforming with "nationally accepted standards," thus beginning to rec-
ognize the duty to comply with uniform signing practices. However, a
46 74 Ohio L. Abs., at 141, 139 N.E. 2d, at 660 (1956).
4T Enacted in 1939.
48 Grant v. State, 192 Misc. 45, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 756 (1948); Olender v. State, 194 Misc.
583, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 578 (1949).
49 LeBoeuf v. State, 169 Misc. 372, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 621 (1938).
50 Ibid; also Dowley v. State, 186 Misc. 571, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 59 (1946).
51 Ziehm v. State, 270 App. Div. 876, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1946); Barna v. State, 217 App.
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strict requirement of compliance with these standards had not yet devel-
oped, for in Piragnoli v. State53 the court found that while the unre-
flectorized condition of the sign in question and its location were "not in
accord with the most recent recommendations," the sign installation was
"adequate to warn a reasonably careful driver," and the State was there-
fore not negligent. The concept that the signing must inform a driver
of the nature of the danger (apparently) first appeared in a case involv-
ing a highway which narrowed and curved sharply as it approached a
narrow bridge.5 4 Here the appellate court upheld the finding of the
Court of Claims that the existence of a "Narrow Bridge" sign located
about 180 feet before the bridge was inadequate because it failed to also
warn of the curve.5 5 This expanded a previous decision where a "Slow"
sign was held to be inadequate warning of a very similar condition.
5 6
The full recognition of the importance of the Manual of Uniform
Traffic Control, promulgated by the New York State Traffic Commis-
sion,57 as a test for determining the adequacy of highway signing can be
illustrated by the decision in Dowen v. State.5 Here the claimants were
riding in an automobile which left the roadway while the driver was at-
tempting to negotiate one of a series of curves. The claimants contended
that the State was negligent in not providing curve warning signs. The
State had, however, provided a "Winding Road" sign at a point approxi-
mately 2600 feet ahead of the accident location. It claimed that because
the highway involved was "not a main road but rather a meandering
road," the requirements of the Manual were met. The Court of Claims
thoroughly examined the text of the manual regarding curve signs and
the "Winding Road" sign. It found that the manual's basic requirement
was for curve signs and that an advisory speed should be posted below
any curve sign where ball bank indicator test 59 showed that the safe
speed was below 40 miles per hour. Reference was made to the material
in the manual describing the use of the "Winding Road" sign, which
indicated that the sign was to be used at the beginning of a series of
curves on "narrow, slow speed, meandering roads" and not to be sub-
stituted for curve signs on "main highways." The ball bank tests made
by the State were accepted by the court, and it held that safe speed
which could be maintained through the series of curves was at least 47
miles per hour. Using this in conjunction with a finding that the high-
53 280 App. Div. 849, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 391, aff'd 305 N.Y. 586, 111 N.E. 2d 645 (1952).
54 Rugg v. State, 284 App. Div. 179, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 2 (1954).
55 Ibid.
56 Canepa v. State, 306 N.Y. 272, 117 N.E. 2d 550 (1954).
57 Substantially the same as the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for
Streets and Highways supra note 16.
58 11 Misc. 2d 555, 174 N.Y.S. 2d 849 (1958).
59 This is a common field engineering test for safe curve speed. See supra note 23.
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way in question was "a meandering as opposed to a main road" the Court
found that there was in this case no duty to post an advisory speed and
that the posting of the "Winding Road" sign without any additional signs
was "sufficient compliance by the State with the provisions of the man-
ual." On these facts the claimants were found not to have sustained the
burden of proving the State's negligence. This detailed quotation from
and discussion of the New York Manual of Uniform Traffic Control De-
vices in a reported opinion is certainly a clear indication of the fact that
the New York Court of Claims had accepted that manual as an almost
absolute standard against which to measure the conduct of the agency
in control of a street or highway with respect to the erection and main-
tenance of traffic signs.
Since that time (1958), however, there have been cases from which
it appears that the New York Court of Claims has developed a policy of
requiring a degree of care that goes beyond the basic requirements of the
Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices to the court's own inter-
pretation of the subtleties the Manual expresses. In a 1960 case, that
tribunal refused to accept ball bank indicator tests made by the State
with a new car.60 It quoted from page 92 of the Manual:
Consideration of sight distance, intersections, accident records, etc.
may dictate a speed lower than that determined by the ball indi-
cator. In such cases, the lower speed will be considered the recom-
mended speed.
Apparently from this and other general considerations, the court im-
plied a duty on the part of the State to protect motorists using average
cars not just those using "new, modern cars."
This case was later reversed on several grounds. While it was not
the primary reason for reversal, the appellate court did specifically ac-
cept the maximum safe speed tests made with the new car.61
In spite of this, the Court of Claims continued in Reynolds v. State62
to require a standard of care beyond the specific standards of the traffic
control manual. This case, as described earlier, involved a curve that
was signed with a curved sign and advisory speed as directed by the
Manual. Ball bank indicator tests, of which the court made no criticism,
showed that the safe speed was 35 miles per hour, and a sign indicating
that speed was properly posted. However, the claimant, whose driver
had skidded on snowy pavement at a speed between 30 and 35 miles per
hour into the path of an oncoming truck, was allowed to recover from
the State in part because the advisory speed was found to have been too
high. The court, pointing to the nature of the curve as being compound
60 Foley v. State, 22 Misc. 2d 1012, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 196 (1960), rev'd, 16 Am. Dec. 2d
90, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 6 (1962).
61 Ibid.
62 See supra note 22.
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(one which has a smaller radius in the center) and a history of five acci-
dents in wet or snowy weather, found that the State breached its duty
by not posting a 25 mile per hour advisory speed.
While slight support for this reasoning can be found in the material
quoted from the Manual above, a result of this type places the traffic
engineer in the unhappy position of having his work considered negligent
by the court even though he has met the specific requirements of the
Manual, but has decided, in good faith, that extraordinary care is not
required. Additionally, from an engineering viewpoint, the facts of this
case do not indicate a situation which required that an exceptionally low
advisory speed be posted. First, the accident history involved wet or icy
pavement accidents only. There was no indication of a history of dry
pavement accidents. Engineering practice is to post an advisory speed
that is the maximum safe speed under conditions of dry pavement and
normal visibility.63 Thus, the accident history does not indicate any
breach of good engineering practice in posting 35 miles per hour. Sec-
ondly, the compound nature of the curve was given as a reason to reduce
the advised speed below that indicated by the ball bank test. Since the
court did not find fault with the ball bank tests, it must be assumed that
they were properly made; in that case the tighter portion of the curve
would have controlled the tests, and this condition would have, thus, been
given due consideration.6 a The third condition considered was the fact
that the curve terminated in a hill. Since the accident in question oc-
curred in the middle of the curve, before the start of the hill, this con-
dition could have had little to do with the accident. Even if it cannot be
said that no traffic engineer would have reduced the advisory speed be-
low that indicated by the ball bank tests, it can be said that the necessity
of such a reduction was, in this case, clearly within a rather unclear area
of engineering judgment. Should not the rules of conduct generally ap-
plied to professional practice control here? 64 If so, the rule that an hon-
est mistake of professional judgment cannot be a basis of liability65
would certainly have resulted in a finding that here there would be no
liability on the basis of a high advisory speed. In short the standard of
care imposed by the Reynolds case is too harsh. It leaves no room for
the traffic engineer to exercise his sincere and honest professional judg-
ment.
While the New York cases discussed so far, have for the most part
involved highway curves, New York's harsh standard is by no means
confined to that type of situation. Failure to provide signs adequately
63 Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices supra note 45 at 98; "National"
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices supra note 16 at 71.
63a Ibid.
64 Prosser op. cit. supra note 5 at 133.
65 Ibid.
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warning of an intersection at which a traffic island and other traffic chan-
nelization devices had been erected was the basis of liability in Firenze v.
State.66 Also, while no such claimants have succeeded in holding the
State liable, it has been suggested that an allegation by a claimant that
the State was negligent for failure to warn of such speculative conditions
as deer crossings stated a sufficient cause of action.6 7
Additionally, New York courts have held governmental agencies
liable in cases based on a breach of duty with respect to regulatory signs
as well as warning signs. The "Stop" sign is firmly established as a regu-
latory as opposed to a warning sign,68 and New York courts have recog-
nized this.6 9 Liability has been found, however, in the situation where
the State has failed to initially install such signs.70 The failure of the
State to maintain "Stop" signs has also resulted in liability.71 Further,
it is readily apparent that the New York Manual of Uniform Traffic Con-
trol Devices establishes the basic duty in cases involving regulatory signs
as well as those involving warning signs.72 It is apparent then that New
York does not view the provision of traffic regulatory signs as an inher-
ent governmental function so as to preclude liability. In fact, it does not
appear that liability based on the inadequacy of regulatory signs differs
in any way from that based on inadequacy of warning signs. New York
applies the same high standard of care in situations involving either type
of signing.
A review of the California position with respect to the liability of
a governmental agency for failure to provide or maintain traffic signs is
important not only because it is an example of a position somewhere be-
tween those of conservative Ohio and liberal New York, but also be-
cause California Code "Tort Claims" amendments enacted in 1963 specif-
ically refer to traffic signs.73
One aspect of the California "Tort Claims Act" is to provide for the
liability of public entities for injuries which are the result of public prop-
erty being in a dangerous condition.7 4 The intent of Section 830.475 ap-
66 208 Misc. 663, 145 N.Y.S. 2d 74, aff'd 1 Am. Dec. 2d 934, 150 N.Y.S. 2d 572 (1955).
67 Morrison v. State, 204 Misc. 222, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 105; also 204 Misc. 224, 123 N.Y.S.
2d 111 (1952).
68 Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, supra note 16 at 27.
69 Applebee v. State, 284 App. Div. 532, 132 N.Y.S. 2d 519 (1954); Robinson v. State,
38 Misc. 2d 229, 237 N.Y.S. 2d 601 (1962).
70 Robinson v. State, supra note 69.
71 Gurevitch v. State, 284 App. Div. 717, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 664 (1954).
72 All cases, supra notes 69 and 71.
73 Calif. Govt. Code § 830.4 and 830.8 (1963).
74 See generally, Law Revision Commission Comment, § 835, Calif. Govt. Code, 32
West's Annot. Calif. Code 185 (1966 ed.).
75 § 830.4 California Government Code: Failure to Provide Traffic Control Signals or
Signs.
(Continued on next page)
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LIABILITY FOR TRAFFIC SIGN
pears to be to exclude the failure to provide regulatory signing as basis
for such liability.76 This in conjunction with Section 830.877 which pro-
vides that liability is possible where there is a failure to warn of "a
dangerous condition," indicates that California makes a distinction be-
tween the liability of a public agency for a breach of duty to provide
regulatory signs and the liability for a breach of duty to provide warn-
ing signs.78 However, it appears that even with respect to a regulatory
device an actionable breach of duty can arise, once the device is initially
provided, if the device installed created a dangerous condition because
it was not complete or was in itself defective.7 9 Also, while lack of proper
regulatory signs cannot be the sole basis for a finding that a condition
sufficiently dangerous to impose liability existed, it can be recognized as
an element of an entire condition which was sufficiently dangerous.8 0
With respect to liability based on inadequate warning signs, the cases
reported so far seem to indicate that the existence of a "dangerous con-
dition" is an indispensable element. Pfeifer v. County of San Joaquin
and Feingold v. County of Los Angeles both indicate that a duty to pro-
vide warning signs arises only where there is a "dangerous condition"
of which to warn."' The term "dangerous condition" is defined in the
code as a condition which would provide a "substantial" as opposed to
a "minor, trivial, or insignificant" risk of damage to property or injury
to person.8 2 It does appear, however, that a failure of the governmental
entity to warn of a highway condition which amounts to a "concealed
(Continued from preceding page)
A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter
merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop
signs, yield right of way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the
Vehicle Code or distinctive roadway markings as described in Section 21460 of
the Vehicle Code.
76 Law Revision Commission Comment, § 830.4 Calif. Govt. Code, 32 West's Annot.
Calif. Code 176 (1966 ed.).
77 § 830.8 California Government Code: Failure to Provide Traffic Warning Signals;
Exception.
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an
injury caused by the failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings
or devices described in the Vehicle Code. Nothing in this section exonerates a
public entity or public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by
such failure if a signal, sign, marking or device (other than one described in
Section 830.4) was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered
the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to and
would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.
78 Dahlquist v. State, 243 Cal. App. 349, 52 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1966).
79 Teall v. City of Cudahy, 60 Cal. 2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 869, 386 P. 2d 496 (1963).
80 Dahlquist v. State, supra note 78; Gardner v. the City of San Jose, 248 Cal. App.
2d 798, 57 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1967).
81 Pfeifer v. the County of San Joaquin, 67 Cal. 2d 177, 60 Cal. Rptr. 493, 430 P. 2d
51 (1967); Feingold v. the County of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 544, 62 Cal. Rptr.
396 (1967).
82 § 830 Calif. Govt. Code (1963).
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trap" can amount to an actionable breach of duty where one is injured
as a result of that lack of warning.
8 3
The recent case of Hilts v. County of Solano8 4 shows that the defi-
nition of what constitutes a hidden trap is not greatly restricted as a
matter of law. The fact situation here, involved a collision between two
trucks at a "dog-leg" (offset) type intersection. There was evidence of
a history of accidents at the location, and testimony of a consulting traf-
fic engineer that the presence of trees near the intersection combined
with differences in elevation between the roadway and the surrounding
land tended to restrict visibility at the intersection. The appellate court
found that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that "the
subject intersection was a trap to a person using the street with due
care." This certainly does not indicate that only very unusual, extremely
dangerous conditions constitute a "hidden trap."
The Hilts case also shows that the adequacy of any warning devices
provided is also an issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Here pro-
vision of just any type of warning is not enough. In this case intersection
warning signs had been in place on all approaches. The court said in ref-
erence to this: 8 5
Here the warning signs that were installed were such as to warrant
the inference that they did not accurately depict the intersection and
might themselves have been partly responsible for the dangerous
potential of the intersection.
On this basis it found that the immunity provisions of Sections 830.4 and
830.8 of the California Code did not, as a matter of law, apply.
Thus, it can be said that a California governmental agency can be
held liable where injury has resulted from its failure to provide adequate
signs warning of a "hidden trap" on its street system. Also, while there
is no liability for a failure to provide regulatory signing, once such sign-
ing is provided, it must be maintained so as not to create in itself a dan-
gerous condition.
Proposed Standard
As indicated by the wide range of the existing rules there is need for
an examination of the factors which would combine to form the elements
of any widely accepted rule as to the standard of care required of a gov-
ernmental agency with respect to its duty to provide adequate traffic con-
trol signs.
Because of its stature in the field of traffic engineering and control,
the "National" Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 6 must be an
83 Dahlquist v. State, supra note 78; Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco,
249 Cal. App. 2d 593, 57 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1967).
84 71 Cal. Rptr. 275, 265 A.C-A. 178 (Calif. App., 1st Dist., Div. 1, Aug. 26, 1968).
85 Ibid. at 285.
86 National Joint Committee, supra note 16.
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important part of any such rule. The history of this work goes back to
1927 when the American Association of State Highway Officials pub-
lished the A.A.S.H.O. Sign Manual. In a joint venture of the American
Association of State Highway Officials and the National Conference on
Street and Highway Safety produced the first Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices in 1935. The current edition, published in 1961, was pre-
pared by the National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control De-
vices which is composed of traffic experts appointed by the National
Association of County Officials; the American Municipal Association; the
American Association of State Highway Officials; the Institute of Traffic
Engineers; and the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances. 87 The Manual thus represents over 30 years of work by
traffic control experts representing the professional groups most con-
cerned with traffic control. All States have adopted this Manual in one
form or another.8 Some States such as Ohio and New York provide for
the promulgation of a state manual, that substantially conforms to the
"National" Manual, by the Highway Department or Traffic Commission. 9
Most States require that local agencies comply with the State Manual 0
Such widespread acceptance makes the Manual the "bible" of traffic en-
gineering, and in the States which by statute require promulgation of
a State Manual, that manual has at least some of the indicia of being an
administrative regulation. Certainly, the provisions of the Manual
should be given great weight in determining the fact of a breach of a
governmental agency's duty to provide traffic control signs.
A review of the contents of the Manual further substantiates this
proposition. Both the "National" Manual and the various state manuals
not only provide specifications with respect to size, shape, color, and
legend of traffic signs, but also provide guide lines for the use of these
signs and other traffic control devices.91 While in some instances con-
ditions warranting the use of a particular sign are described by an ob-
jective standard, the conditions warranting the use of many signs are
defined by specific tests.92
With the Manual providing a widely accepted, detailed standard for
providing traffic signing, which in many states has the weight of admin-
istrative regulation, certainly it would not be unwise to adopt a rule in
which a failure to comply with its provisions established a prima facie
87 Ibid. at 1; Marsh, Why Adhere to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control De-
vices?, 33 Traffic Engineering (4) 13 (Jan. 1963).
88 Traffic News, 33 Traffic Engineering (4) 12 (Jan. 1963).
89 E.g. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. L. § 1680; Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.09.
90 Op. cit. supra note 88; e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. L. § 1682; Ohio Rev. Code §4511.11.
91 National Joint Committee, op. cit. supra, note 16 at 9.
92 Ibid.; compare conditions for application of the "Hill" sign p. 65 with those for the
turn sign p. 55, the reverse curve sign p. 58, and the "Low Clearance" sign p. 71.
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breach of duty. This would mean that where the defendant agency had
provided a level of signing below that required by the Manual, it would
have the burden of showing that such signing was adequate. Where the
defendant agency had complied with the Manual, the claimant would
have the burden of showing that sound engineering judgment required
extraordinary care. This is essentially the rule that the New York Court
of Claims applied in the Dowen93 case, but carried too far in the Reyn-
olds94 case.
A second element of the proposed rule would be adoption of the
California position that a governmental agency cannot be held liable for
failure to provide regulatory, as opposed to warning, signs. This aspect
of the proposed rule is supported by cases which hold that the regulatory
aspect of traffic control is an inherent governmental function.95 There is
also precedent that to allow recovery based on a failure to provide regu-
lation amounts to making the controlling agency an insurer of the safety
of its highways.0 6 This immunity with respect to provision of regulatory
signs should not, however, be extended to protect an agency which has
freely made the decision to install a regulatory device but has installed
that device in such a way that it has in itself created a dangerous con-
dition,9 7 or an agency which has failed to properly maintain a regulatory
device.98 This result is necessary largely because, by making the initial
installation, the agency has invited reliance on the device; and highway
users, acting within the scope of their reliance, may unknowingly place
themselves in a dangerous position.99 Additionally, it should be noted
that the Manual, because it clearly categorizes regulatory and warning
signs, would also be of great help in making the necessary distinctions
involved here.
Conclusions
In review, it can be said that inadequate traffic signing is a major
contributing factor in many highway accidents. However, because nearly
all streets and highways are under the control of a governmental agency,
the principles of sovereign immunity add great complexity to the problem
of actual recovery based on inadequate signing, and as shown by a study
of decisions in three major states, the rules as to the required standard
93 Dowen v. State, supra note 58.
94 Reynolds v. State, supra note 22.
95 Supra, note 32.
96 Perry v. City of Santa Monica, 130 Cal. App. 2d 370, 279 P. 2d 92 (1955).
97 Teall v. City of Cudahy, supra note 79.
98 Dudam v. City of San Mateo, 167 Cal. App. 2d 593, 334 P. 2d 968 (1959); Schauf v.
Southern California Edison Company, 243 Cal. App. 2d 450, 52 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1966).
99 Rose v. Orange County, 94 Cal. App. 2d 688, 211 P. 2d 45 (1949); Teall v. City of
Cudahy, supra note 97.
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of care are at great variance. Finally a standard rule which includes
both the use of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices as the
basic test of the adequacy of traffic signing and immunity with respect
to the function of traffic regulation, is proposed. While wide acceptance
of this rule is doubtful because it would involve basic policy changes in
the area of sovereign immunity, one can always dream Utopian dreams
and hope for its acceptance.
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